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Ref’s comments Our response 
Ref.1: (1) ‘The issue of DC requires 
some qualifications’  
The section leading to hypothesis 3 on 
unionisation, starting on p.8, has been 
completely re-written to take account 
of this and other refs’ comments. 
Ref.1: (2) Expand on forms DC might 
take to show paper’s limitations 
A new opening sentence and a new 
para has been inserted at the start of 
the section headed ‘Direct 
Communication’, starting on p.3. 
Ref. 1: (3) Only two countries.   The limitations para in the conclusion 
(p.20) has been expanded to take 
account of this.  
Ref. 1: (4) Limits of Cranet survey.    (1) We suggest that the high absolute 
numbers promote the survey’s 
reliability in this case (p.14). (2) We 
refer readers to Brewster, Mayrhofer 
and Morley for a full discussion of 
these issues.  (3)There is no better 
organisational-level data available.  
Ref.1: (5) Does introduction of HRM 
really require that HR director sits on 
board? 
 This is not mentioned as relevant to 
HRM, but as a relevant variable to 
establish whether it can be called 
‘strategic’.  It is one of a set of inter-
related variables designed to establish 
whether HR can be called strategic and 
it is (as the ref seems to acknowledge) 
hard to see HR as ‘strategic’ if it is not 
the case.   
Ref. 1: (6) Danish union density; better 
reference needed. 
We removed the Rgaczewska et. al., 
and inserted a better reference, to 
Jrgensen (2002) on p.12.    
Ref. 1: (7): explanation for high union 
density is strong demand for info from 
skilled workers unsatisfactory. 
This was not our argument, so we have 
changed the discussion on p.13 to 
explain our point more clearly. 
Ref. 1: (8): Tables need to be 
clearer/more informative.  
We have included a new table 1 and 
more information for Table 2.  On 
Table 3, the suggested comparison 
with official stats does not work 
because they do not provide bandings 
of the same type used by Cranet.  To 
introduce figures with  different 
bandings seems to us to clutter the 
table rather than clarify it.  
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Ref. 1: (9): Lundvall not Danish We call him Scandinavian. 
Ref. 2: (1) Need for stronger statement 
as to why DC can be used as a test of 
Brewster. 
See new sentence beginning ‘This 
amounts..’ on p.3.  More substantially, 
see new para on pp. 5-6. 
Ref. 2: (2): Need better lead in to 
hypothesis 3.   
This section has been completely re-
written to take account of this 
comment as well as ref. 1's. 
Ref. 2 (3): Need persuading of 
rigour/reliability of the ‘DC’ measure: 
worried about term ‘brief’: could it be 
interpreted as ‘inform through JCC’?    
We now point out on p.15 that the 
question we ask follows one asking 
about communication to employees 
through JCCs and is therefore unlikely 
to be interpreted in this way by 
respondents.  
Ref. 2 (4): More detail needed on 
characteristics of respondent 
companies, especially size. 
We provide this in a new table 1, and 
related text pp. 19-20. 
 
 
 
 
The Antecedents of Direct Communication in British and Danish firms: country, 
‘strategic HRM’ or unionisation? 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the antecedents of private sector managers’ propensity to 
communicate directly to employees in Britain and Denmark by use of large-
scale survey data.  It tests Brewster’s (1995) argument that European HR 
managers are constrained in applying American versions of HRM and considers 
other theories suggesting that companies in the two countries would have 
different drivers of their communications practices.  It is also relevant to 
‘varieties of capitalism’ discussions of how national systems structure firm-level 
behaviours.  It finds two antecedents for managers’ propensity to communicate 
directly, irrespective of country: whether the senior HR manager is involved in 
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strategy formation and the degree of unionisation.  These are common to 
companies operating in both Britain and Denmark and it is therefore concluded 
that Brewster’s argument must to that extent be rejected.     
 
Introduction 
 
 Brewster contended (1995) that the HRM concept is essentially North 
American, should not be seen as universally applicable and in particular has 
limited applicability for most European countries.  In his influential discussion, 
he argued that “Defining and prescribing HRM strategies for organizations 
implies that the organizations concerned are free to develop their own 
strategies” (Brewster, 1995:2).  He further argued that with the exception of 
Great Britain, European firms are generally not free to develop HRM strategies 
autonomously.  Instead they operate with restricted autonomy, constrained by 
culture, legislation, trade union involvement and workplace norms but especially 
by institutional frameworks.  He therefore developed a “European model of 
HRM” which reflects his suggestion that variations in HRM practices should be 
viewed as products of different types of national context (‘institutional’ and 
‘HRM’) with shared European features rather than as products of firm-level 
strategic decision making. 
 Thus, unlike in North America and Great Britain, variations in the 
application of HRM practices by firms are not a consequence of autonomous 
 4 
Strategic HRM (SHRM) initiatives by managements and human resource 
professionals, but are primarily influenced by national context and in particular 
industrial relations institutions.  The purpose of this paper is to test this 
contention in terms of one set of practices central to SHRM.  This is an 
appropriate test of Brewster’s argument, since Strategic HRM aims to achieve 
strategically anchored employee involvement through High Involvement 
Management (HIM) techniques.  Direct communication with employees is a 
core HRM practice.  The question this paper specifically addresses is whether it 
is the case that direct communication is a firm-level strategically driven practice 
or whether it is, as Brewster would suggest, institutionally driven. In addition we 
investigate the degree to which unionization at the firm-level impacts on direct 
communication. In order to address these issues we employ data from British 
and Danish private-sector firms.    
The paper is structured as follows. In the following sections we discuss 
the concept of direct communication and the significance of the British-Danish 
comparison for our investigation. Thereafter we present three strands of 
theorising relevant to sources of variation in direct communication within firms.  
The three strands are: strategic HRM, country effects and unionisation at the 
firm-level, and each section leads to an hypothesis. Next, we deploy firm-level 
data for the UK and Denmark derived from the 2003 CRANET-survey to test 
each of the hypotheses.  Finally, we draw conclusions. 
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Direct Communication 
‘Direct communication’ is used here to describe management information-
giving to employees, that is not mediated through employee representatives.  
Wood (1999:367) observes that, “The study of human resource management 
(HRM) has been invigorated by the promise that there is a best-practice, high 
involvement management that can guarantee superior organizational 
performance.”  Wood further observes that direct communication practices are a 
key feature of HIM.  Other experts make similar arguments.  Thus, for example, 
one of the seven dimensions of HIM that Pfeffer (1998) identifies as having 
been demonstrated to result in significant economic returns is that of direct 
communication with employees in regard to financial performance and strategy.  
As a consequence, direct communication is now typically seen as one key 
element of an organisational strategy of employee involvement, ‘an umbrella 
term covering a wide range of voluntary employer-led initiatives that are 
designed to encourage more active employee participation in (organisational) 
affairs’ (Caldwell, 1993: 136).  The purpose of these initiatives is ‘to increase 
the level of employee commitment to an organisation’ (Guest et.al., 1993: 192).  
These initiatives may include some or all of the following: first, ‘increased 
information (flow) down the organisation’; second, ‘increased information 
(flow) up the organisation’; third, changes in job design; fourth, financial 
involvement or participation; and, fifth, changes in leadership or management 
style towards a more participative approach (Guest et.al., 1993: 192).  Thus 
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direct communication is a central element in employee involvement.  Direct 
communication may take different forms, be addressed to different categories of 
employees and cover different subjects.  It spans a number of different practices 
including briefing the workforce, quality circles, regular meetings with all or 
part of the workforce, suggestion schemes, appraisal interviews,  newsletters and 
electronic communication.  The increased use of practices to facilitate direct 
communication between management and employees in the private sector was, 
according to Forth and Millward (2002), one of the more striking developments 
in employment relations in the 1990s.  In this paper, we concentrate on the 
briefing of non-managerial employees on issues of business strategy, financial 
performance and work organisation.         
 
Leaving aside direct discussion of the issue of organizational performance, this 
paper explores the related question of the antecedents of direct communication 
practices in British and Danish private-sector firms.  We aim to test the degree 
to which direct communication practices actually are a consequence of 
management-initiated, firm-level strategic approaches to HRM. The paper 
therefore tests the association between three factors: country, ‘strategic’ HRM 
and firm-level unionisation and the extent of direct communication.  Contrary to 
Brewster’s European model of HRM, it shows that the first of these variables is 
not associated with direct communication, but the other two are.  
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The British-Danish Comparison 
 
The Danish-British comparison provides appropriate national conditions 
for testing Brewster’s argument about the impact of national institutional setting. 
There are important differences between the two countries’ institutional 
frameworks. Within the influential ‘varieties of capitalism’ conceptualisation, 
Britain has been unambiguously categorised, along with North America, as a 
‘Liberal Market Economy’ [LME] and Denmark as a ‘Co-ordinated Market 
Economy’ [CME] (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Gingerich, 2005). The gap 
between the two models, it has been argued by one ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
theorist, is tending to increase (Thelen, 2001: 72).  Neither country occupies 
what Hall and Soskice (2001) describe as an ‘ambiguous’ position. The LME-
CME distinction is explored further below, but at this stage the essential point is 
that the two countries fall clearly within the two different categories. The Danish 
model is somewhat distinctive within the CME category for its high degree of 
regulation by collective bargaining rather than by legislation, requiring relatively 
little state intervention for its maintenance (Due et.al. 1994; Scheuer, 1998). The 
Danish model is relatively uncontested at the industrial and political levels in 
comparison with, for example, the German (Lane, 2000).  
 
Strategic HRM  
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As indicated at this paper’s outset, a central issue is the extent to which a 
key SHRM practice, direct communication, may in fact be described as 
‘strategic’ in the European setting. Schuler and Jackson (2005) argue that the 
transformation of personnel management into HRM from the mid-1970s 
onwards was a response to a growing professionalism among HRM practitioners 
and a growing recognition of the importance of human resources to companies’ 
success.  As a consequence, businesses began to view human resource 
professionals as partners “who should be involved in the strategic decision 
making processes of the firm” (Schuler and Jackson 2005:12).  This aspect of 
HRM gave rise to the concept of SHRM in which there is a particular emphasis 
on the role of HR professionals informing and reflecting the organization’s 
strategic objectives.   
Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal (1999) distinguish two generic 
systems of SHRM practices, “calculative” (cf. Fombrun et al. 1984) and 
“collaborative” (cf. Beer et al. 1985) with more recent versions of collaborative 
HRM embracing HIM.  Calculative practices are aimed at achieving efficiency 
at the individual level through the application of individual appraisals and 
reward systems.  Collaborative or HIM practices derive from a view of 
employees as participants in a project based on commitment, communication 
and partnership and thus include the regular, direct communication of strategic, 
financial and organizational information about the enterprise to employees.   
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Collaborative HRM therefore embraces HIM.  Gooderham, Nordhaug and 
Ringdal (1999) argue that both approaches may be present in the same firm. 
From an SHRM viewpoint the scale of a firm’s SHRM practices, 
including direct communication, is determined by the centrality of the human 
resource department in strategy development (Schuler and Jackson, 2005:13).  
That is, for HRM to meet the needs of the business “effective HRM”, i.e. HIM,  
“requires an understanding of and integration with an organization’s strategic 
objectives”.  It follows that this understanding and integration is most effectively 
achieved if the human resource department is involved at the outset in the 
development of business strategy.  
Thus, from the SHRM perspective the extent of direct communication 
between management and employees is a product of the degree to which the 
human resource function is party to the strategy development process.  Hence 
we hypothesise as follows:    
Hypothesis 1: Direct communication within firms is greater if the head of human 
resources is involved in strategy formation. 
 
Country Effects 
 
Our second argument, leading to hypothesis 2, concerns the characteristics 
of the institutional setting and builds on Brewster’s European model of HRM.  
Three types of literature encourage the expectation that Britain and Denmark 
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would have different levels of direct communication.  The first, already touched 
on above, is the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature.  The second is that seeking to 
link national employment relations systems to national culture.  The third is 
work  demonstrating the deep historic roots of national characteristics in the 
area.  We deal with these three approaches in turn.  
‘Varieties of capitalism’ literature explains that in CMEs, stronger 
information-sharing is to be expected than in LMEs, as part of a general 
structural bias towards consensus-building, in particular within organisations  
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 24). There are therefore well- embedded practices in 
companies for information-sharing with employees (Kristensen, 1997).  These 
practices are externally supported by strong unemployment protection measures 
(Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice, 2001: 173).  In LMEs, where there is greater 
reliance on external labour markets to regulate the employment relationship, 
such arrangements are less in evidence. Managements’ information-giving is 
directed at financial institutions rather than employees (Vitols, 2000).  
  
One analyst arguing the importance of culture for national employment 
relations systems (Pot, 2000) suggests that managers have high communications 
practices for cultural reasons.  Thus, Nordic managers would adopt relatively 
‘collaborative’ HR strategies and  communicate intensively with employees 
irrespective of the existence or otherwise of specific institutions such as unions, 
in contrast to British managers.  Danish specialists stress that this is part of a 
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wider Danish management style, demonstrated in the relatively low degrees of 
‘authority by title’ and ‘power distance’ between managers and employees in 
relation to other European countries (Rogaczewska et. al., 2004: 245).  
 
A third type of literature emphasises the importance of different historical 
trajectories and, in common with the two other literatures discussed above, 
stresses the two countries’ quite different current evolutions in respect of 
employee communications.  Nordic countries generally have historically been 
distinguished by high degrees of co-operative management-union behaviour at 
workplace level (Galenson, 1998). A Scandinavian researcher recently asserted 
that Denmark still has the highest level of employee involvement in 
organisational decision-making processes of any European country (Lundvall, 
2002: 111-112). Another Scandinavian commentator has suggested that Danish 
managers’ consultative style is primarily based on deeply-embedded consensual 
and voluntary behaviours rather than on institutions or legislative compliance 
per se (Kristensen, 1997).  Due, Madsen and Jensen (2000) demonstrated the 
enduring significance of the historic compromise between Danish employers 
and labour at the end of the Nineteenth Century.  In Britain, on the other hand, 
the history of information sharing has been very different and the contemporary 
results shallower.  Even during the exigencies of the Second World War, 
employers were reluctant to share information with employees (Croucher, 
1982).  Later state initiatives to extend existing joint management-union bodies 
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through legislation on ‘industrial democracy’ in the late 1970s failed because 
they received only equivocal support from both unions and management bodies 
(Taylor, 1993: 241).  A recent analysis of employer stances in relation to the 
Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations in Britain shows that 
this tradition remains strong.  The Regulations (which do not specify union 
forms of representation) allow employers the option of inaction unless 
employees trigger the regulations, while managers often have equivocal attitudes 
to their implementation (Hall, 2005).   
 
All of these three types of approach, ‘Varieties of Capitalism’, cultural 
theorists and those emphasising different historic evolutions,  point in a similar 
direction.  Our second hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
 Hypothesis 2: Direct communication within firms varies according to country, 
with Danish firms characterised by a stronger degree of direct communication 
than British firms. 
 
Unionisation 
 
  ‘Indirect’ communication to employees via employee representatives is a 
characteristic of the European model of employment relations. In Europe, its 
relation to direct communication, i.e. the focus of this study, is generally 
complementary. Research on twenty-five British-based Multi National 
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Companies (MNCs) operating in Europe found that ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
channels operate in complementary ways (Wood and Fenton O’Creevy, 2005).  
Kessler at.al., (2004) in their research on the European subsidiaries of a group of 
British-owned companies showed that employees with access to union and 
works council representation saw direct communication as more useful than 
those without such access (Kessler et.al: 528).  The researchers suggested that 
such employees are ‘more likely to take a general interest in developments and 
consequently view other means (i.e. other than ‘indirect’ communication—
authors) of communication as useful’ (Ibid: 528).  Employees in European 
countries, they argue, may have more confidence in dealing with direct 
communication where collective voice mechanisms are present (528). In other 
words, unionisation increased their confidence in their capacity to evaluate and 
act on management information. This confidence seems likely in turn to be 
reflected in their elected representatives’ requesting information from 
management irrespective of the channel used.  
           
  
  In Britain, as in many other countries, trade union membership has declined 
and stood at around 30% of the workforce at the time of the last comprehensive 
survey (Cully et al.1999).  In the 1970s, when union membership, power and 
influence were greater, unions insisted where possible on managers 
communicating to the workforce solely through them. This, together with 
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employer reservations, was a contributory reason for British ‘indirect’ 
consultative bodies (Joint Consultative Committees) having been historically 
been weak relative to their equivalents in other EU countries (Taylor, 1993).   
As power shifted towards management in the 1970s, they increasingly insisted 
on direct communication to employees. (Ramsay, 1977; Hyman, 1997; 
Marchington, 1993; Denham et al. 1997).  Kessler et.al. (2004) point out (513) 
that unions could perceive this as either a conscious attempt to by-pass and 
marginalise them, or as a complement to union channels of communication. In 
the 1990s, this posed a real dilemma for unions, interested in helping employees 
improve their information on the company’s directions on work organisation and 
financial prospects, but opposed to being themselves by-passed.  Increasingly, 
union representatives appear to have made a pragmatic shift towards Kessler 
et.al.’s second view especially since direct communication may on occasions 
entail bargaining or at least joint employee-management decision-making and 
therefore bring an extension of worker influence on management (Wood and 
Fenton O’Creevy, 2005: 30).   
 
 
Although little research has focussed on workplace representatives’ 
attitudes to management communication, they are clearly no longer in a position 
to insist that only they may be used as the sole channel of communication. There 
may also be employee pressure on representatives for them to take a more 
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positive attitude to ‘direct’ communication.  It seems likely in an LME, where 
external labour markets are relatively important, that increasingly widespread 
feelings of insecurity among employees mean that information about company 
strategy and prospects is of correspondingly greater interest to them.      
 
Research on Britain has mirrored that in Europe more widely in noting an 
association between unionisation and ‘direct’ communication.  Most unionised 
workplaces now have multiple communication channels (Bryson et al. 2004).  
The last available full report of the British Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey (WERS), Cully et al. (1999) demonstrated increasing management use of 
direct communication across a range of issues, and that this was particularly 
apparent in unionised workplaces.  Preliminary findings from the latest WERS 
appear to confirm this trend (Kersley et.al, 2005).  Other research using the 
WERS data set also concluded that levels of information disclosure were higher 
in unionised settings although this did not lead to higher levels of employee 
commitment or organisational performance (Peccei et al., 2005).  
 
Suggestions that European workplace representatives increasingly encourage or 
at least see no prospect of opposing direct communication seem likely to apply a 
fortiori to Denmark.  About 82% of the Danish workforce is unionised; 
membership has remained stable since 1994, but density has fallen due to an 
increase in potential members (Jrgensen, 2002).   Danish unions have benefited 
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from involvement in a ‘Ghent system’ of unemployment insurance, greatly 
raising employee incentives to membership (Western, 1997). They face little 
competition from works councils; indeed, councils and unions work in 
complementary and even identical ways. Since 1973, Danish employees have 
had rights to elect representatives to board level, and ‘Co-operation committees’ 
(Samarbejdsudvalget) may receive information regarding the firm’s efficiency 
and competitiveness, ‘co influence’ management decisions and co-determine 
others (Haug, 2004). One authority cites as commonplace a practice whereby 
works councillors meet with management in the morning to reach agreement, 
and the same committee reconvenes in the afternoon as a union-management 
group to ratify the morning’s decisions (Slomp, 1998). At workplace level, a 
1999 survey of over 7,000 Danish workplace representatives showed 37% of 
them reporting that they felt that management used direct communication to by-
pass representatives (Navrbjerg, 1999).  However, these data cannot be 
compared with other data to determine whether there is a tendency for such 
communication to increase.  Navrbjerg (2003) argues that in general Danish 
management employs ‘soft’ or “collaborative” HRM methods that do not 
directly threaten trade unionism, since workplace representatives are widely 
viewed positively by management as ‘sparring partners’ rather than as 
opponents. 
   Kristensen (1997) suggests that skilled employees in Denmark, especially in 
manufacturing, demand high levels of information on production matters from 
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management.  This is consistent with Peccei et.al.’s suggestion (based on 
literature from different countries) that where there is a high proportion of 
skilled labour (as in Denmark), there is proportionately greater pressure on 
management to communicate directly (Peccei et. al, 2005: 15).  It therefore 
seems likely that Danish workplace union representatives actively encourage 
managers to communicate directly, whilst simultaneously trying to ensure that 
this does not threaten their role as intermediaries (Navrbjerg, 2003).     
 
It has been questioned whether co-operative relations are being eroded outside 
of the workplace, with possible ‘spill-over’ effects for the latter. Some 
researchers have pointed to an apparently increasing need for legislative 
interventions required to compensate for failures for employers and unions to 
agree, but a degree of state intervention has on the other hand been required for 
decades as is therefore not novel (Falkner and Leiber, 2004).  Moreover, recent 
successful tripartite projects in labour market co-ordination suggest that wider, 
extra-workplace projects involving unions continue to be useful to both the state 
and employers (Etherington and Jones, 2004). 
 
In short, the literature demonstrates an association between unionisation and 
managers’ direct communication practices in Western Europe.   However, it is 
only possible to speculate that union representatives themselves exert pressure 
on management to achieve this and it may be that the underlying characteristics 
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of unionised workforces are the key issue.  In other words, unionised workforces 
may demand more direct communication from management.  In this case, the 
extent of union membership rather than representatives’ attitudes could be the 
most relevant factor.  Our third hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
 Hypothesis 3: Direct communication within firms varies according to the 
level of unionisation at the firm-level.  Firms characterised by high levels of 
unionisation will have a stronger degree of direct communication than firms 
with low levels of unionisation. 
 
Methodology 
Data 
 The data used in the study were derived from the 2003 CRANET survey, 
by far the most comprehensive international survey of HR policies and practices 
at the organisational level.  CRANET is a regular comparative survey of 
organisational policies and practices in HRM across the world conducted by a 
network operating in 39 countries  (see Brewster, Mayrhofer and Morley, 2004, 
for full details of the questionnaire and its methodology).  The questionnaire’s 
unit of analysis is the organisation and the respondent is the highest-ranking 
corporate officer in charge of HRM.  The 2003 questionnaire was developed 
using an iterative process between network members and based on previous 
experience of running survey rounds since 1990. 
 
Deleted: postal 
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 For the UK, respondents were identified via a database of senior HR 
managers in 8,780 UK private and public sector organizations with over 100 
employees.  1,115 organizations responded, giving a response rate of 12.7%. For 
Denmark, the population of organisations was identified using a database from 
the Danish Census Bureau.  Questionnaires were distributed to every 
organisation of over 100 employees on this database producing a total of 2,653 
organisations.  A total of 516 organisations responded to the survey in Denmark, 
giving a response rate of 19%.  Despite the relatively low response rates the high 
absolute numbers of responses should promote reliability of the results. In 
addition, the data for both countries was examined to ensure that it was 
representative of the population in terms of industry sector and organisation size.   
 
As this paper focuses on private sector firms, all public sector 
organisations were removed from the data set.  Because of potential “country-of-
origin” effects all firms with non-indigenous ownership were also removed.  
This reduced the overall sample to 951 responses of which 695 comprised UK 
private sector firms and 256 Danish private sector firms.   
Table 1 gives an overview of firm size by country.  While firms in our 
British sample are generally larger than those in its Danish equivalent, just over 
a quarter of the UK firms employ between 100 and 250, and over half of the 
Danish firms have over 250 employees.  In other words, the national samples are 
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reasonably well-matched since they contain medium-sized as well as large 
firms.  As we note below, we also control for size in our analyses.    
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
   
 
Measures and analysis  
 
 The dependent or criterion variable, Direct Communication, was a 
composite measure of direct communication, i.e. whether organisations brief 
clerical and manual employees on issues of business strategy, financial 
performance and the organization of work.  In the Cranet questionnaire, this 
question follows another asking about indirect (i.e. through staff representative 
bodies) methods of communication to employees.  A 7-point scale was created, 
with 6 indicating the briefing of both clerical and manual levels on all three 
issues, and 0 indicating no briefing at either level on any of the issues. 
 The independent variables were measured as follows: 
Strategic nature of HRM: This is an index consisting of responses to seven 
questions from the CRANET survey and is designed to assess how ‘strategic’ 
the role of the HR department within the organisation is.  The seven questions 
are: 
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• Does the head of the personnel/HR department have a place on the main 
Board of Directors or the equivalent? (1 yes 0 no) 
• At what stage is the person responsible for personnel/HR involved in the 
development of business strategy? (4 from the outset to 1 not consulted). 
• Who has the primary responsibility for major policy decisions on the 
following issues: pay and benefits, recruitment and selection, training and 
development, industrial relations, workforce expansion/reduction. (1 line 
management, 2 line management in consultation with HR, 3 HR in 
consultation with line management, 4 HR department). 
The sum of the responses to the above seven questions was used to form an 
index that ranged from 1 (low degree of strategic HRM) to 20 (high degree of 
strategic HRM). The reliability of this index as measured by Cronbach alpha 
was satisfactory (0.71).  
Country: This national-context variable was operationalised as the two nations, 
Britain and Denmark. 
Union Presence: This is an index consisting of the responses to three questions 
from the CRANET survey and was designed to asses the degree of union 
presence within organisations.  The three questions were: 
• What proportion of the total number of employees in your organisation 
are members of a trade union?   Firms were divided into three categories 
(1-3) depending on their response.  These categories were 0%, 1-50%, and 
over 50%. 
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• Do trade unions have any influence on your organisation?  (1 yes, 0 no). 
• Do you recognise trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining? (1 
yes, 0 no). 
The sum of the responses to the above questions was used to form an index that 
ranged from 1 (no union presence) to 5 (high degree of union presence). The 
index had high reliability as measured by Cronbach’s alpha (0.82).  
 In addition it was considered that such factors as size, industry sector and 
the age of the firm may have some bearing on the degree of direct 
communication within a firm and these were included as control variables. Their 
operationalisation is as follows: 
Industry sector: This is a dichotomous variable that distinguished manufacturing 
(0) and services (1).  
Organisation size: This is operationalised as the log (10) of the total number of 
employees. 
Age of organisation: This is operationalised as the log (10) of the number of 
years since the organization was founded. 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
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(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
 
 
 
 The results (Table 2) show that all of the variables, including the criterion 
variable, were distributed significantly differently to a normal distribution.  As 
the criterion variable was actually truncated, it was recoded as high briefing 
(those organisations that scored 4 or more on the 7-point scale used above) or 
low briefing (those that scored 3 or less), in order to create a dichotomous 
variable.  Due to this and the amount of skew in a number of the predictor 
variables a logistic regression analysis was used to test our hypotheses.   
 Prior to testing the hypotheses a bivariate correlation analysis of all of the 
study’s variables was conducted.   Table 3 shows that there is initial support for 
Hypothesis 1 in that there is a significant correlation between Strategic Nature 
of HRM and Direct Communication.  Similarly, there is support for Hypothesis 3 
in that there is a relatively strong correlation between Union Presence and 
Direct Communication.  In regard to Country and Direct Communication the 
correlation is also significant indicating some support for Hypothesis 2.   
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
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 In general, the correlations between the independent variables, including 
the control variables, are relatively small.  However, there is one marked 
exception: the strong correlation between Country and Union Presence (.442).  
In order to communicate the nature of this correlation more comprehensively, 
Table 4 presents a cross-tabular analysis of Country by Union Presence.  
 
                                     (Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
 
The table reveals 31% of firms located in the UK were characterized by a 
complete absence of any union presence as opposed to 0% for organizations in 
the Danish setting.  Quite clearly the testing of our hypotheses requires 
controlling for the interaction effect between Country and Union Presence. 
 A logistic regression analysis using the enter method was conducted in 
three stages.  Firstly, the control factors of Industry Sector, Organisation Size 
and Age of Organisation were entered into the analysis.  At the second stage of 
the analysis Country, Union Presence, and Strategic nature of HRM were 
entered and then at the third stage, the interaction between Country and Union 
Presence was entered into the analysis. This analysis was performed using 
listwise deletion of missing values, reducing the sample size to 536.  Since this 
maintains a ‘subjects to predictors’ ratio of 89:1 it is still sufficient to provide 
reliable results (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). Tables 5 and 6 display the results.  
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(Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here) 
 
 Table 6 shows that Country did not have a significant effect on Direct 
Communication.  Therefore Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
 
 Union Presence was shown to have a significant positive impact on Direct 
Communication: those organisations with higher levels of unionisation tend to 
engage in direct communication to both manual and clerical employees on a 
wider range of issues.  Thus Hypothesis 3 is supported.  This effect disappeared 
when the interaction between Country and Union Presence was entered into the 
analysis, but as this final step in the model was not significant it can be 
disregarded. 
 Strategic nature of HRM had a positive relationship with briefing 
incidence, indicating that those firms in which HR is highly involved in the 
development of HR strategy are more likely to brief their clerical and manual 
workers on a range of issues.  Thus Hypothesis 1 was supported. 
 We may note that, of the control variables, Industry Sector was the 
only one to have a significant impact on Direct Communication.  The negative 
regression coefficient indicates that manufacturing firms are more likely to brief 
their manual and clerical staff.  
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 Finally, in regard to the complete model we observed that explained 
variance expressed in terms of Nagelkerke's adjusted general coefficient of 
determination (R2) is 0.19  (Nagelkerke, 1991). This indicates a satisfactory 
level of overall explanation of direct communication despite the limited number 
of statistically significant explanatory variables we have employed.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The paper has examined a significant aspect of Brewster’s (1995) argument that 
European companies are not generally free to determine HR strategies because 
of the constraints on them. The paper’s findings are also important in relation to 
institutionalist approaches that focus on national structures and practices in 
developing their cross-national models. They also have relevance to the ongoing 
debate about the complex links between direct communication with employees, 
unionisation and their relationships to organisational performance (for a 
summary see Peccei et al., 2005).  
 
Brewster’s contention was tested through comparing data from Britain and 
Denmark, which provided it with only equivocal support. The paper establishes 
that the antecedents of firms’ propensity to communicate directly with 
employees in Britain and Denmark are similar in both countries despite the 
marked systemic differences in the two national cases.  They are the 
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involvement of HR managers in strategy development, and the level of 
unionisation.  Institutionalist  approaches stress the differences between the 
national systems and the way that these structure firms’ behaviours, but we find 
that direct communication has similar antecedents in private industry in both 
countries.    
 
Our primary finding is that in both Britain and Denmark,  firms involving their 
HR managers in strategy development are more likely to have direct 
communication than those which do not.   This finding holds true even when the 
level of unionisation at the firm-level is controlled for.  Thus, independent of the 
unionisation factor, a strategic approach to HRM, denoted by the integration of 
the HRM function into the strategy formulation process. is associated with high 
levels of direct communication with employees.  In this sense, then, HR 
managers encourage a strategic approach to employee communication where 
allowed to do so by senior management.  Our research indicates that in those 
firms where HR managers are involved in strategy development, the information 
component of HIM .  Brewster’s argument is therefore refuted, since a 
‘strategic’ approach to HRM is possible not only in the LME setting of Great 
Britain, but also in the CME setting of Denmark.  
Our secondary finding is that the level of unionisation was relevant. 
Union density (and not simply union recognition) was significant in determining 
whether direct communication occurred.  Overall levels of unionisation were 
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significant predictors of how far companies communicated across a wide range 
of issues with employees.  Previous British studies using smaller data sets have 
shown an association between union presence and direct communication and our 
findings confirm these analyses.  We also show that the same holds true in the 
Danish case.  Our findings tend to suggest that unionisation levels have 
proportionate effects in encouraging managements to communicate directly 
with employees.  We therefore tentatively offer the hypothesis that the 
characteristics of unionised workforces, in particular a scepticism about 
management information is perceived by management and in turn induces 
management to intensify their communication efforts.  Case study investigation 
would be required to investigate whether this hypothesis is supportable and if it 
proves correct, to demonstrate precisely how the mechanisms operate in 
practice.  However, it seems clear that the almost complete absence of 
discussion of the role of unionisation at the firm-level in SHRM literature for the 
deployment of HRM practices is an unfortunate deficit that should be addressed. 
 
The paper has two significant limitations.  First, Brewster’s thesis is only 
tested through one international comparison and through a limited set of 
variables.  Second, the data used are for larger firms —those employing over 
100.  Generalisation across the whole of the two national populations of 
companies is therefore impossible.  Further international comparisons are also 
required to provide a comprehensive test of Brewster’s argument.   
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Our firm-level findings nevertheless serve to underline a limitation of the 
national-system approach Brewster adopted in the development of his European 
model of HRM, and also used in ‘varieties of capitalism’ theorising since 
national-system approaches may obscure firm-level similarities. Further research 
of other practices across other countries is clearly required, but our study 
undermines Brewster’s argument to the extent that it suggests that strategic 
HRM is possible at least in the context we have examined.  Similarly, it shows 
significant firm-level similarities at firm level across two countries representing 
highly distinct varieties of capitalism.  
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Table 1 Firm size by country 
Firm size (number of 
employees) 
Denmark (percentage of 
sample) 
UK 
100-250 45.7 25.9 
251-500 25.8 28.2 
501-1000 13.7 21.4 
Over 1000 14.8 24.5 
 100.0 (n= 256) 100.0 (n=695) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality 
 
 Statistic Df Significance 
 
Industry sector 
 
.370 618 .000 
Organisation size 
 
.104 569 .000 
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Age of 
organisation 
 
.071 569 .000 
Country 
 
.476 536 .000 
Level of 
unionisation 
 
.187 536 .000 
Degree of HR 
involvement in 
strategy 
 
.356 536 .000 
Direct 
communication 
 
.212 536 .000 
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Table 3: Bivariate correlations between predictors and the criterion 
variable (Spearman’s Rho). 
 
 Mean s.d.  Sector Size 
(log
) 
Age 
(log
) 
Coun
try 
Level 
of 
union
isatio
n 
Involv
ement 
of HR 
in 
strateg
y 
 
Sector 
 
0.4551 .498  .104 
** 
-
.044 
.039 -.280 
** 
.044 
Size (log) 
 
2.716 .527 .104 
** 
 .092 
* 
-.177 
** 
.005 .125 
** 
Age (log)  
 
1.576 .473 -.044 .092 
* 
 -.08 
* 
.051 .021 
Country  
 
1.270 .444 .039 -
.177 
** 
-
.080 
* 
 .562 
** 
.064 
** 
Level of 
Unionisati
on (1-6) 
 
3.222 1.835 -.280 
** 
.005 .051 .562 
** 
 .075 
* 
Involveme
nt of HR 
in Strategy  
 
.444 .497 .044 .125 
** 
.021 .064 
* 
.075 
** 
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Direct 
communic
ation  
 
1.590 .492 -.205 
** 
-
.022 
-
.009 
.070 
* 
.234 
** 
.119 
** 
*p<.05  **p<.01 
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Table 4 Level of Unionisation by Country  
 
 UK 
(%) 
Denmark 
(%) 
0% 38 0 
1-10% 22 4 
11-25% 8 9 
26-50% 13 18 
51-75% 12 35 
76-100% 7 34 
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Table 5 Model Summary (n=534) 
Model Chi 
square 
Df Signifi
cance 
Step 
chi-
square
d 
Step df Step 
significance 
 
1 
 
30.599 3 .000 30.599 3 .000 
2 
 
65.719 6 .000 35.121 3 .000 
3 
 
66.243 7 .000 .524 1 .469 
 
Table 6 Coefficients of variables included in the model (n=534) 
 
Model β Wald Sig 
1 
(Constant) 
Industry sector 
Age (log) 
Size (log)  
 
2.279 
-.957 
-.219 
-.0.29 
 
15.965 
28.314 
1.292 
..031 
 
.000 
.000 
.256 
.861 
2 
(Constant) 
Industry sector 
Age (log) 
Size (log) 
Country 
Unionisation 
Involvement of 
HR in strategy 
 
1.469 
-.761 
-.301 
-.162 
-.014 
.229 
.724 
 
4.758 
14.603 
2.255 
.839 
.002 
11.703 
14.753 
 
.029 
.000 
.133 
.360 
.960 
.001 
.000 
3 
(Constant) 
Industry sector 
Age 
 
.857 
-.745 
-.315 
 
.1.081 
13.808 
2.437 
 
.428 
.000 
.119 
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Size 
Country 
Unionisation 
Involvement of 
HR in strategy 
Country X 
unionisation 
-.174 
.572 
.382 
.733 
 
-.132 
 
.954 
.444 
2.956 
15.047 
 
.523 
.329 
.505 
.086 
.000 
 
.469 
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